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Introduction
The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20,
2010, resulted in the spill of more than four million barrels of oil into
the Gulf of Mexico.1 The disaster was a result of human agency2 and
caused extensive damage to the economy of the Gulf states, the
ecosystem, and the property of businesses and individuals in the areas
1.

Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill &
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and
the Future of Offshore Drilling, at vi (Jan. 2011).

2.

Id. at vii (“The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been
prevented. The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be
traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and
Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that
they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.”). Both the
federal and state governments were also partially responsible for
“fail[ing] to anticipate and prevent [the] catastrophe, and fail[ing] again
to be prepared to respond to it.” Id. at ix.
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affected.3 President Obama called the spill “the worst environmental
disaster America has ever faced,”4 and the oil affected approximately
650 miles of the Gulf Coast, with Louisiana being hit the hardest.5
This Note focuses on the tax treatment of casualty losses6 to
individuals affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, as well as
future oil spills and contamination disasters, under section 165(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Code section 165(c)(3) covers “casualty
losses”—losses not connected with a trade or business or a project
entered into for a profit and that arise from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or
other casualty.”7 It is unclear whether section 165(c)(3) applies in the
oil spill context, but this Note advocates that such spills should be
treated as an “other casualty.”8 Utilizing the Code in a modified way
to compensate victims of such disasters is a superior approach to the
current framework for compensating victims of casualty losses stemming from oil spills. The current approach applies a combination of
strict applications of section 165(c)(3), claims under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA),9 private claims processes set up by tortfeasor oil
companies, and private causes of action by individuals and businesses
against those oil companies. This Note argues that this current framework is disjointed, inefficient, and ought to be streamlined, and it
suggests an alternative to the current approach: IRS subrogation with
a removal of section 165(h) floors and an adoption of the Code section
165(i) election, through a modified understanding and application of
Code section 165(c)(3), particularly as it pertains to the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford
Act)10 and the OPA.
3.

Id. at vi (“The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully
counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the region’s natural
systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total tens
of billions of dollars.”).

4.

Id. at 173. Interestingly, however, the President did not invoke the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

5.

Id.

6.

See I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006) (“General rule.—There shall be allowed as a
deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”).

7.

I.R.C. § 165(c) (“In the case of an individual, the deduction . . . shall be
limited to . . . losses of property not connected with a trade or business
or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire,
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”).

8.

I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).

9.

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 and in scattered sections of other
titles).

10.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006).
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Part I discusses the mechanics of Code section 165(c)(3). It
explains the judicial history of this section of the Code, including the
standard statutory interpretation approach that courts have used in
light of the limited legislative history surrounding this provision. It also
explains how casualty loss deductions are calculated, covering the
burden of proof, the floors involved in calculating a casualty loss, and
the social and political reasons for these limitations. It goes on to
examine the meaning of this section of the Code itself, applying the rule
of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) to explore whether property
damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill can or should be
treated as a casualty loss, ultimately arguing that it should be treated
as such. It also discusses the Tax Benefit Rule, a doctrine limiting
casualty loss deductions to those “not compensated by insurance or
otherwise.”11 The Rule requires individuals who take a casualty loss
deduction and subsequently make a recovery for that loss to count that
recovery in their income for the year in which they receive the recovery,
potentially causing major financial hardship to individuals.
Part II identifies and analyzes the circuit split between the Courts
of Appeal for the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits regarding whether
application of section 165(c)(3) requires physical damage to the
property, or whether general decline in property value suffices. Oil
spills occupy a unique niche within the broader category of casualty
losses because publicity surrounding oil spills contributes to a broad
decline in property values, regardless of whether a property was
directly damaged or contaminated by the spill. To allow for casualty
loss recovery due to a general decline in value of surrounding
properties, provisions must be put in place to allow for widespread
recovery and to prevent inequitable outcomes due to the jurisdiction
in which the taxpayer resides. By streamlining the framework for
recovering from oil spills, the federal government could bypass the
circuit split on general property value decline and adopt the Eleventh
Circuit’s position as announced in Finkbohner v. United States,12 at
least in the oil spill context.
Part III identifies three current approaches to compensating oil
spill victims: the OPA, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), and
private causes of action in tort and insurance. It identifies shortcomings in each of these avenues of recovery, focusing on the burdens and
tradeoffs taxpayers face in the wake of casualty losses. It suggests
that the current infrastructure for dealing with casualty losses is inefficient and results in unnecessary hardships for taxpayers and argues

11.

I.R.C. § 165(a) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance
or otherwise.” (emphasis added)).

12.

Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1986).
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that there ought to be a more streamlined, uniform system of
recovery for oil spill victims with casualty losses.
Part IV discusses the Stafford Act and Code section 165(i)(1),13
which makes special provisions for individuals claiming casualty loss
deductions when the President of the United States invokes the
Stafford Act. This Part also discusses legislation Congress enacted to
bolster the benefits of the Stafford Act in response to Hurricane
Katrina, allowing for elimination of the floors and ceilings associated
with casualty loss deductions. It explains when and how the Stafford
Act is implemented in response to natural disasters and examines the
political and social justifications for the allowances the Stafford Act
provides for victims of natural disasters. Further, it analyzes
legislative approaches that the federal government has taken in the
past, in conjunction with an invocation of the Stafford Act, to adjust
the floors of Code section 165(h)14 to allow more widespread taxpayer
recovery. It explains why President Obama did not invoke the
Stafford Act in response to this disaster by offering a comparative
analysis of the Presidential response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill off
the coast of Alaska in 1989. An invocation of the Stafford Act would
have been an inappropriate presidential response to the Deepwater
Horizon incident, given the restrictions, mechanics, and justifications
of the Stafford Act, particularly because this and other oil spills are
almost always the result of human agency. But the direct and indirect
damages suffered by victims in oil spills are so analogous to those
suffered by the victims of natural disasters that, at the very least, the
tax allowances extended by an invocation of the Stafford Act ought to
be extended to the victims of oil spills.
Finally, Part V identifies a solution for the shortcomings of the
current methods of recovery for individual taxpayers suffering prop13.

I.R.C. § 165(i)(1) (“[A]ny loss occurring in a disaster area . . . may, at
the election of the taxpayer, be taken into account for the taxable year
immediately preceding the taxable year in which the disaster occurred.”); I.R.C. § 165(k) (describing the procedure for treatment as a
disaster a loss where a taxpayer is ordered to relocate or demolish his or
her residence because of a Stafford Act disaster declaration).

14.

I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)–(2) (“Treatment of casualty gains and losses.—(1)
$100 limitation per casualty.—Any loss of an individual described in
subsection (c)(3) shall be allowed only to the extent that the amount of
the loss to such individual arising from each casualty, or from each
theft, exceeds $500 ($100 for taxable years beginning after December 31,
2009). (2) Net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it exceeds 10
percent of adjusted gross income.—(A) In general.—If the personal
casualty losses for any taxable year exceed the personal casualty gains
for such taxable year, such losses shall be allowed for the taxable year
only to the extent of the sum of—(i) the amount of the personal
casualty gains for the taxable year, plus (ii) so much of such excess as
exceeds 10 percent of the adjusted gross income of the individual.”).
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erty damage in this or future oil spills, drawing on an approach
recommended by another scholar:15 IRS subrogation and a removal of
the Code section 165(h) floors.16 Instead of taxpayers individually
filling claims with the BP Oil Spill Fund, this Note proposes that the
Code section 165(h)17 floors be eliminated in the case of an oil spill,
allowing everyone to deduct casualty losses to property. Then, the
IRS can subrogate those claims and recover from the BP Oil Fund or
other funds created by section 2715 of the OPA,18 thereby avoiding
lost tax revenue. This approach creates an equitable remedy for
taxpayers, lowers transaction costs for all parties involved, and would
be easy to implement, especially given the federal government’s use of
subrogation in other contexts.

I. Casualty Loss Deductions for Individuals: The
Administrative Limitations of Applying I.R.C. § 165(c)
to the Victims of Oil Spills.
Code section 165 provides as a general rule that “any loss
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise” may be deducted as a loss, with limitations
set by its subsections.19 Section 165 has been called a “free partial
insurance scheme.”20 Justifications for allowing a casualty loss deduction include ensuring that the income tax reflects a taxpayer’s ability
to pay and ensuring that the income tax equals consumption plus
savings, since “amounts lost to casualties are neither consumed by the
taxpayer . . . nor saved.”21
There is little legislative history about the meaning of “casualty”
as contemplated in section 165(c), and its parameters “have evolved

15.

Andrew Blair-Stanek, Using Insurance Law and Policy to Interpret the
Tax Code’s Loss and Medical Expense Provisions, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. 309, 343–44 (2007).

16.

I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)–(2).

17.

Id.

18.

33 U.S.C. § 2715(a) (2006) (“Any person, including the Fund, who pays
compensation pursuant to this Act to any claimant for removal costs or
damages shall be subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action
that the claimant has under any other law.”).

19.

I.R.C. § 165(a).

20.

Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 310–11 (“The taxpayer’s co-pay amounts
to 100% minus the marginal tax rate, with deductibles (in the insurance
sense of the word) applying to individual taxpayers in some
situations.”).

21.

Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal Income
Taxation of Individuals ¶ 24.01 (3d ed. 2013 cum. supp. no. 1).
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judicially.”22 Courts have interpreted casualty losses to individuals
under section 165(c)(3) to require an element of suddenness, unusualness, unexpectedness, or some combination of the three.23 Additionally,
casualty losses are subject to two major statutory monetary limitations. First, under section 165(h)(1), each loss must exceed $100.24
Second, under section 165(h)(2), a net casualty loss is allowed “only
to the extent it exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income
(‘AGI’).”25 In some disaster situations, these floors and other
statutory barriers to recovery from casualty losses are lifted, either
under a specific provision of the Code26 or by legislative mandate.27
This provision of the Code has been called “free insurance,”28 and
has been criticized for discouraging people from purchasing property
insurance because of the benefits associated with claiming a
deduction.29 But the 10 percent AGI “floor” helps mitigate this moral
hazard effect by preventing claims for minimal losses.

22.

Maher v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 593, 596 (1981).

23.

See, e.g., id. at 598 (requiring that an event be “sudden, unusual, or
unexpected” (quoting Burns v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 203, 210
(N.D. Ohio 1959), aff’d per curiam, 284 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1960)));
Appleman v. United States, 338 F.2d 729, 730–31 (1964) (“Among
characteristics of the specific casualties enumerated in the section are
suddenness and unforeseeability of the occurrence. Fire and shipwreck
are undesigned, sudden, and unexpected events. While storms are to a
degree predictable the factors of their violence and the particular site of
loss or damage are uncertain.”).

24.

I.R.C. § 165(h)(1).

25.

I.R.C. § 165(h)(2). For example, if a taxpayer has an adjusted gross
income (AGI) of $50,000 and sustains a loss valued at $6,000, that
taxpayer is entitled to report the casualty loss on his income tax return:
$6,000 less $100 is $5,900; 10 percent of $50,000 is $5,000; $5,900
exceeds $5,000 by $900, so $900 is the amount of the deduction.

26.

E.g., I.R.C. § 165(k) (offering special casualty loss deduction treatment
when a taxpayer is “ordered to demolish or relocate residence in disaster
area because of disaster”).

27.

Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61 (providing safe harbor methods
for taxpayers to use in determining the amount of casualty losses due to
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and eliminating the $100 and 10
percent of AGI floors for casualty losses as a result of those hurricanes).

28.

William A. Klein et al., Federal Income Taxation 355–56 (15th
ed. 2009) (“If [a lawyer deducting a $10,000 loss] is in the 35 percent tax
bracket, the deduction would save him $3,500 in taxes, thus reducing his
after-tax loss to $6,500. It therefore has the same economic effect on him
as . . . insurance with no deductible and a 65 percent ‘co-payment’ . . . .
In cases where the deduction is available, therefore, it discourages people
from purchasing insurance . . . .”).

29.

Id. at 356 (explaining that a taxpayer receiving a casualty loss
deduction for a personal loss would receive this so-called free insurance
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In assessing whether a loss is deductible under section 165(c)(3),
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the loss is, in fact, a
casualty loss.30 Evaluation of whether the complete or partial
destruction of property constitutes a casualty loss requires an
application of the ejusdem generis rule:
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis it is necessary to define
the word ‘casualty’ in connection with the words ‘fires, storms,
shipwreck’ immediately preceding it. By the rule of ejusdem
generis, where general words follow the enumeration of
particular classes of things, the general words should be
construed as applicable only to those of the same general nature
or class as those enumerated. The rule is based on the reason
that, if the Legislature had intended the general words to be
used in their unrestricted sense, there would have been no
mention of the particular classes.31

A casualty loss may be the result of human agency. For example,
in Shearer v. Anderson,32 the Second Circuit held that a car accident
that was “not caused by the willful act or neglect of the owner” was
“analogous to a shipwreck,” and allowed a casualty loss deduction,
admitting that it was unclear whether the act was caused by faulty
driving on an icy road or the freezing of the car’s motor.33
It is common knowledge that oil companies are integral to the
Gulf states’ economies, and that drilling and refining are widespread
practices in and around the Gulf of Mexico. Property owners in the
Gulf states are aware of oil drilling and refining activity on, near, or
in the vicinity of their property: being “on notice” in this way might
weigh against a finding that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was
“unexpected.” But even if property owners are on notice of manmade, abnormally dangerous activities near their property, they are
entitled to report casualty losses in the event of an unexpected
“without paying an arm’s-length premium”—a true economic benefit,
since personal insurance premiums are themselves not deductible).
30.

See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (“[The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s] ruling has the support of a
presumption of correctness, and the petitioner has the burden of proving
it to be wrong.”).

31.

Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. Supp. 771, 774 (E.D.S.C. 1950) (internal
citation omitted); see also Lyman v. Comm’r, 83 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir.
1936) (“[W]here words of a particular or specific meaning are followed
by general words, the general words are construed to apply only to
persons or conditions of the same general kind as those specifically
mentioned, unless there are other provisions clearly indicating that the
rule is not applicable.”).

32.

Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927).

33.

Id. at 996–97.

1369

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 63· Issue 4·2013
Casualty Loss Reform in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster

accident or disaster connected to that abnormally dangerous
activity.34
In Durden v. Commissioner, taxpayers’ residences were located
within a mile of a quarry that engaged in heavy blasting.35 A “very
unusual blast, heavier than a normal charge”36 cracked the
foundations, walls, dormer windows, plastering, and basements of
several homes. The court noted that the “damage was caused by the
blast . . . [and] not . . . any other form or process of gradual
deterioration.”37 Furthermore, the court determined that even though
the blast originated from an act of human agency, “a proper definition
of the term casualty does not exclude the intervention of human
agency, such as involved in setting off the blast involved in this case,
and the prime element is that of suddenness as opposed to some
gradually increasing result.”38 The court emphasized that it was the
suddenness and unexpectedness of the event causing the damage that
qualified it as a deductible casualty loss. The court also indicated that
even though the taxpayers knew the blasting was taking place nearby,
it did not automatically follow that they had assumed the risk.
One important caveat in Durden is that the taxpayers had
secured a promise from the blasting company that “no unusual
blasting would be done.”39 This separate agreement could distinguish
the Durden victims from the victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. Although the United States Mineral Management Service
(MMS) regulates Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations
(OCS) to try to minimize environmental impact and avoid and limit
incidents like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, MMS reported on June
17, 2009, that 1,443 offshore drilling “incidents” occurred between
2001 and 2007, including “41 fatalities, 302 injuries, 10 losses of well
control, 11 collisions, 476 fires, 356 pollution events, and 224 crane
and other lifting events.”40 Thus, in addition to being on notice that
oil drilling and refining activities occur routinely near their property,
Gulf state residents have MMS statistics and data showing that
accidents are a routine part of the industry. The MMS reported that
“[t]he majority of incidents occurring in the OCS were related to

34.

Durden v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 1, 4 (1944).

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 2.

37.

Id. at 3.

38.

Id. at 4.

39.

Id.

40.

Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Operations, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,639, 28,642 (proposed
June 17, 2009) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
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operational and maintenance procedures or human error.”41 Given the
type of notice that the MMS has given to Gulf state property owners,
it is unclear whether oil spills fall within the U.S. Tax Court’s holding
in Durden. The persistent question is how unexpected is “unexpected
enough” to constitute a casualty.
It is also unclear whether damage to property suffered much later,
or outside the immediate vicinity of the Deepwater Horizon accident,
would qualify as casualty losses, and if so, what limits would apply. In
Pugh v. Commissioner, the United States Board of Tax Appeals
(B.T.A.) held that a diminution in value of farmland contaminated by
seeping oil and saltwater from oil wells on the property did not
constitute a casualty loss.42 At least one commentator has suggested
that the B.T.A. denied the deduction because “pollution occurring
over a long period of time is not a sudden enough event for a casualty
loss.”43 In Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, a case that was not tried
under tax principles but rather under tort law, the Fifth Circuit held
that an oil company was not liable for damage from an oil spill when
oil spread seventy miles from the location of a grounded tanker.44 The
court found that although the company “might reasonably anticipate
that the oil would probably wash ashore somewhere, it had no reason
to have anticipated that the oil would probably wash ashore in a
heavily populated area and then be tracked into businesses and
homes.”45 This troubling result indicates that there could be similar
barriers to recovery in the context of the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill—either to individual claims against BP, or to successfully
receiving deductions under section 165(c)(3).
Section 165(a) explicitly provides that casualty losses are only
deductible to the extent that they “are not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise.”46 If compensation for the loss is received
during the year that the loss is deducted, the calculus is easy, and the
compensation is simply subtracted from the amount to be deducted. If
a taxpayer is not compensated in the year of the deduction, but
anticipates that he will be, he must subtract the anticipated amount
of compensation from the amount he deducts for the casualty loss. On
the other hand, if there is “no reasonable prospect of recovery, the
entire loss is taken into account when sustained; and any unsuspected
41.

Id.

42.

Pugh v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 429 (1929).

43.

Thomas H. Steele, The Tax Consequences of the Ownership and
Cleanup of Environmentally Contaminated Properties, 26 Real Prop.
Prob. & Tr. J. 655, 658 (1991).

44.

Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1449–50 (5th Cir. 1989).

45.

Id. at 1449.

46.

I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006).
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subsequent recovery is taken into income when received, subject to
the tax benefit doctrine.”47
In Perry v. United States, the court justified the Tax Benefit
Rule, holding that it “would be inequitable for the taxpayer to reduce
his taxes for prior years on account of the [deductions], and not to
pay taxes on them when he got them back. This . . . rule . . . is based
altogether on equitable considerations.”48 But the tax consequences of
the timing of the compensation can potentially be rather stark: if a
taxpayer is compensated for an item he deducted in a previous year,
and that compensation “occurs in a high income year . . . the
progressive tax rate structure is likely to exact a higher toll than if
the taxpayer had foregone the original deduction so that the later
recovery would be a return of capital, and therefore not taxable.”49 If
taxpayers do not know when, whether, or how much they will be
compensated for their casualty losses, they could very well become
financial victims a second time, due to their use of a provision in the
Code designed to help them.
The existing jurisprudence on casualty losses does not provide a
conclusive determination as to whether an oil spill like the Deepwater
Horizon disaster would constitute a casualty loss. The IRS has,
however, issued guidelines to victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill indicating that it will honor casualty loss deductions associated
with this disaster as long as they fit within the standard requirements
for casualty losses.50 It is unclear whether this allowance is being made
based on a strict application of the Code, or whether it is a decision
the IRS made based on public policy. Even if this allowance is based
on an application of the Code, the opportunities for widespread
recovery are limited because the President did not invoke the Stafford
Act, and because there are no guidelines about when the property
damage must have occurred. Additionally, the other available avenues
of recovery, including the OPA, GCCF, and insurance do not
47.

McMahon & Zelenak, supra note 21, ¶ 24.04[2].

48.

Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958); see also
John G. Corlew, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations,
and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 Vand. L.
Rev. 995, 999 (1967) (noting that the tax benefit rule is an equitable
doctrine (citing Perry, 160 F. Supp. at 271)).

49.

Corlew, supra note 48, at 995.

50.

See, e.g., IRS, Gulf Oil Spill: Questions and Answers 2 (2010),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4873a.pdf (“A taxpayer
may be able to claim a casualty loss deduction if the payments . . . the
taxpayer receives or reasonably expects to receive, are less than the
taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property.”); IRS, Overview and
Guidance for Assisting Taxpayers Impacted by the Gulf Oil
Spill 10 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4906.pdf
(same).
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guarantee uniform odds of recovery, which could result in detrimental
financial consequences due to the Tax Benefit Rule. The limitations of
the existing availability of casualty loss deductions for the Deepwater
Horizon disaster and other oil spills weighs in favor of developing a
more widespread, equitable recovery system for oil spill victims.

II. Casualty Losses and General Decline in Property
Value: An Argument in Favor of Adopting the
Eleventh Circuit’s Approach to Casualty Losses for
Oil Spill Victims
In an August 2010 article, economist Mark Fleming said, in
relation to Gulf state property values following the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, “It’s not only about whether the oil arrives . . . .
There’s evidence [that] something as catastrophic as this scares people
away.”51 The same article reported that coastal homes along the Gulf
of Mexico “may lose as much as $56,000 each in value as buyers shun
areas marred by the worst oil spill in U.S. history . . . .”52 Even
Kenneth Feinberg, administrator of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility,
admitted that the spill caused declines in property value, saying,
“There’s no question that the property value has diminished as a
result of the spill . . . .”53 But, he qualified, “[t]hat doesn’t mean that
every property is entitled to compensation.”54 Part of the problem
with calculating declines in property values in the Gulf states is that,
in the wake of the housing bubble, Florida in particular was hit very
hard with plummeting property values. The same article reports that
in 2010, Florida had “the third-highest rate of foreclosure filings in
the nation, behind Nevada and Arizona . . . .”55 But CoreLogic, a real
estate data firm that conducted a property value study on the
affected area, took this into account in its study. While the OPA
allows for compensation based on a decline in property value,56 those
assessments are made on a case-by-case basis, and Kenneth Feinberg
himself said that not every property owner would be entitled to a
recovery for a decline in his property’s value.

51.

John Gittelsohn, BP Spill May Cost Gulf Coast Homes $56,000 Apiece
in Value, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:01 AM), available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-02/gulf-coast-homes-to-lose-up-to56-000-in-value-as-bp-spill-spoils-beaches.html.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the OPA).
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In Finkbohner v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit showed a
willingness to allow casualty loss deductions for a decline in property
value even when the taxpayer’s property itself incurred no physical
damage.57 This is a boon to Florida taxpayers who might not have
suffered contamination or other damage to their property but who
nonetheless suffered an economic loss from a drop in property value.
But the Ninth Circuit disagrees with the Eleventh Circuit over
whether there is a requirement of actual physical damage for a section
165(c)(3) casualty loss, or alternatively whether permanent
diminution in property value even without physical damage suffices.
Florida taxpayers are covered for now, but Deepwater Horizon victims
in other circuits might not fare so well; and if the Supreme Court
weighs in, Florida’s luck might run out, too. It is clear that the
Deepwater Horizon spill has created not only direct losses in value
due to physical damage to property, but also indirect losses in
property value due to immediate and lingering public concern about
the environmental impact of the disaster. Neither the GCCF nor the
federal courts have been able to arrive at a uniform way of
compensating victims whose property value declined as part of the
aggregate decline in value due to the disaster. This results in
disparate treatment of victims, and this disparity cries out for an
official resolution.
In Finkbohner, the Eleventh Circuit held that when a disaster
results in “changes in the neighborhood . . . that will outlast the fresh
recollection of disaster,” and not merely temporary buyer resistance, a
property owner can deduct the permanent decline in property value
even if his property did not itself sustain physical damage.58 The
taxpayer’s home was situated on a cul-de-sac with eleven other
houses, and after a flood, seven of those houses had to be demolished
because of flood damage, leaving the taxpayer’s home “in a lonesome
neighborhood, more exposed to crime, and with much diminished
privacy.”59 The court held that although it would not allow a casualty
loss deduction for temporary buyer resistance, the situation in this
case was distinguishable because of the permanent changes to the
neighborhood that would “outlast the fresh recollection of disaster,”
and allowed the deduction.60
In a 1994 California memorandum opinion, the U.S. Tax Court
indicated that it would allow a section 165(c)(3) deduction for a
decline in the value of a taxpayer’s home in California due to the

57.

Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1986).

58.

Id. at 727.

59.

Id. at 724.

60.

Id. at 727.
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destruction of trees on adjacent lots.61 After the damage to the trees,
“the house . . . [stood] in a field, rather than a forest.”62 Although the
house itself suffered no damage, the court allowed a $20,000 casualty
loss deduction, attributable to both “the lost trees and the overall
reduction in the aesthetic value.”63 But the holding in this case is
likely distinguishable from other Ninth Circuit64 cases because the
taxpayer owned the home and the damaged adjacent lots, and the
court found that the taxpayer’s lots “constitute[d] a single piece of
property” for the purposes of determining the adjusted basis of the
property.65 Applying this outcome to Deepwater Horizon victims
would likely only result in limited recovery by property owners who
own multiple, adjacent parcels of property.
This distinction is particularly likely in light of a subsequent
opinion in which the U.S. Tax Court reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
disallowance of deductions for a decline in property value. In
Chamales v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court did not follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Finkbohner in assessing whether
taxpayers suffered a casualty loss due to a decline in their home value
in Brentwood, California, following the O.J. Simpson murder trial.66
The court based its decision on the premise that the Ninth Circuit
has “consistently held that an essential element of a deductible
casualty loss is physical damage.”67 In dicta, the court said assuming
arguendo that it did apply the Eleventh Circuit’s rule, the damage to
the taxpayer’s property was “more akin to a fluctuation in value”
than a “permanent devaluation . . . which no court has found to
support a deduction under Section 165(c)(3).”68 The court disallowed
61.

Beams v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3152 (1994).

62.

Id. at 3154.

63.

Id.

64.

The connection between the U.S. Tax Court and other federal courts is
complex. In Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), the U.S. Tax Court
held that “better judicial administration requires [the Tax Court] to
follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where
appeal from [the Tax Court’s] decision lies to that Court of Appeals and
to that court alone.” Id. at 757. Thus, because Beams, 67 T.C.M.
(CCH) 3152, arose in California, and an appeal to the Tax Court’s
decision would have gone to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the Tax Court was bound by its holding in Golsen to follow Ninth
Circuit precedent, at least in as much as it is clear that the issue in
Beams is “squarely in point” with the issues addressed in other Ninth
Circuit cases. Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757.

65.

Beams, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3154.

66.

Chamales v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1428 (2003).

67.

Id. at 1433.

68.

Id.
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the casualty loss deduction, and upheld the Ninth Circuit’s
requirement of physical damage to support a valid casualty loss.
It is hard to say whether a decline in property value due to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill will materialize as a mere “fluctuation in
value”69 or a “permanent devaluation,”70 but the disparate treatment
of declines in property value is likely to result in inequitable outcomes
to victims of the spill. Admittedly, this is one of the “gray areas”
where it would be extremely difficult to draw a line: How much of a
decline in value yields a casualty loss? Should there be an upper limit
to the amount that a taxpayer can claim for this kind of casualty
loss? How would this type of casualty loss interplay with the Tax
Benefit Rule71 if, in fact, the decline in value is only a temporary
fluctuation? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of
this Note, but the ambiguity inherent in this facet of casualty losses
in the oil spill context underscores the need for a streamlined
approach to maximize equity and efficiency of taxpayer recovery in
the wake of this kind of disaster.

III. A Flawed Framework: The Shortcomings of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, and Insurance
The OPA, the GCCF, and insurance (both private and federally
funded) are all ways in which victims of oil spill casualty losses can
seek compensation for damage to their property. But these means of
recovery are not consistently applied, resulting in stark consequences
for taxpayers. Not all victims will recover their losses, and, even if
they do recover, their recoveries could be inequitable, due to
inconsistent judicial interpretations of legislation and ad hoc
evaluations of casualty loss claims. Additionally, without a clear
expectation of prospects for recovery, individuals claiming casualty
loss deductions can encounter significant financial repercussions under
the Tax Benefit Rule. These means of recovery certainly have their
benefits, but there is a pressing need for a uniform system that
incorporates these benefits to create a uniform scheme of
compensating casualty loss victims. Gulf County, Florida,
Commissioner Bill Williams said it best, in criticizing the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility:
In regards to claims in general, it would be our recommendation
that Congress provide greater clarity and direction to this
process. Probably the greatest frustration for everyone involved,
69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

See supra Part I (discussing the Tax Benefit Rule).
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both private and public, were constant changes in the claims
process. There were eight different policies, procedures,
processes and applications within the first two months. The
summer was almost over before our businesses and individuals
finally had a solid process.72
A.

The OPA and the Problem of Judicial Interpretation

The OPA73 is a statutory scheme developed in the aftermath of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. While it creates broad protections
for victims of oil spills, its vague language, inadequate financial
responsibility requirements, and flexibility leave much to judicial
interpretation and chance. The OPA certainly goes a long way toward
protecting oil spill victims, but it is by no means comprehensive.
The OPA provides that the responsible party in an oil spill is
strictly liable for removal costs caused by the spill,74 including “any
removal costs incurred by any person for acts taken by the person
which are consistent with the National Contingency Plan.”75 The
OPA also includes a provision for private rights of action for damage
to real or personal property stemming from an oil spill “incident,”
defined in the OPA as “any occurrence or series of occurrences having
the same origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any
combination thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of
discharge of oil.”76 The OPA establishes a $75,000,000 cap on liability
for other costs for an offshore facility.77
One problem with the OPA is that despite the strict liability for
cleanup and the private right of action, the way the statute defines
“incident” seems to indicate that the incident “is therefore the
occurrence (i.e. collision, grounding or explosion) which results in the
oil spill, and not the spill itself.”78 The implications of this semantic

72.

Statement by Bill Williams, Gulf County Commissioner
(Florida), to House Oversight & Government Reform Committee
4 (June 2, 2011), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2012/01/Bill_Williams_Testimony.pdf.

73.

33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).

74.

33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (“[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility
from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a
discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs
and damages . . . that result from such incident.”).

75.

33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(B).

76.

33 U.S.C. § 2701(14).

77.

33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3).

78.

Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 5 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 283, 293 (1993).
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distinction are best seen in the Fifth Circuit’s treatment of the issue
in a pre-OPA case, Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco.79
In Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd., an oil tanker grounded off the coast of
Louisiana and spilled 65,500 barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of
Mexico.80 A group of plaintiffs “who suffered damages from oil tracked
onto their premises by tourists and beachgoers” brought suit against
the oil company.81 The plaintiffs’ property was damaged due to “the
particular combination of tides and winds that existed at the time of
the spill,” which caused oil to wash ashore approximately seventy
miles from the grounding.82 The court found for the oil company,
holding that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was not foreseeable to
the defendants, and that the defendants therefore owed no duty to
the plaintiffs:
While the appellee might reasonably anticipate that the oil
would probably wash ashore somewhere, it had no reason to
have anticipated that the oil would probably wash ashore in a
heavily populated area and then be tracked into businesses and
homes. “To be found liable a defendant must have knowledge of
a danger, not merely possible but probable.”83

The Fifth Circuit denied recovery since the damage was a result
of unforeseeable consequences from the oil spill, not from the initial
incident itself. By not providing clear parameters for recovery, the
OPA does not guide interpretation of this issue. Writing about the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, Thomas Wagner commented “one would infer
that Congress intended to authorize property damages due to the
spread of oil discharged in such an incident . . . [but i]f the
recoverable damages need only relate to the spill (and not the
originating incident), OPA provides no ‘outer limit’ to this remedy.”84
An issue that has yet to arise is what would happen in the event
that a hurricane caused the discharged oil to migrate to unexpected
locations. A report from June 2010 offered probability statistics
showing that at the time there was a 10 percent chance that a
hurricane wind field could pass through the oil slick, and a 4 percent
chance that the hurricane could be an intense, Category 3–5
hurricane, “with a significant storm surge and the potential to carry
79.

Id. at 293 (citing Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447 (5th
Cir. 1989)).

80.

Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd., 868 F.2d at 1448.

81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 1449–50 (quoting Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean
Corp., 833 F.2d 65, 68 (11th Cir. 1987)).

84.

Wagner, supra note 78, at 294.
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tar deposits far inland.”85 The same report stated that “any hurricane
in the vicinity of the slick has the potential to bring waves that break
protective booms and allow the oil to be displaced into coastal salt
marshes and beaches above the tide line.”86 The National Flood
Insurance Program covers oil damage to policyholders’ property as a
result of floods, but as noted in Part III.C below, that program is not
foolproof, and because time parameters have not been established
around liability under the OPA, it is unclear whether all derivative
damage from an oil spill would be covered under the statute.87
While at first blush it would seem that the OPA provides
adequate remedies to private individuals who are victims of oil spills,
the ambiguity in the plain words of the OPA indicates a pressing
need for clearly defined, streamlined remedies for individuals whose
real or personal property is damaged as a result of a spill.
B. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the Decline in Private Causes
of Action: Problems of Timing, Discretion, and Ad Hoc Evaluations

In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, President Obama
and BP negotiated to create a system for BP to address victims’
claims for costs and damages incurred as a result of the spill. BP set
aside a twenty-billion-dollar fund and established the GCCF to
administer payments to those seeking restitution. The GCCF was
established to supplement the OPA recovery process, and the fund
that BP allocated was generous. But since it was created outside of a
legislative framework, there are no checks and balances, and the fund
is so new that the system is being defined and administered in an
impromptu way. This lack of accountability is particularly
troublesome since one of the goals of the GCCF is to decrease the
instances of private causes of action. The GCCF has the potential to
provide victims with relief, but its standards and procedures need to
be more narrowly defined.
Tort remedies are available to victims of the spill, but as GCCF
administrator Kenneth Feinberg has said,
[U]nder [the GCCF], you will receive, if you’re eligible,
compensation without having to go to court for years, without
the uncertainty of going to court, since I’ll be much more
generous than any court will be . . . . And at the same time,
you won’t need to pay lawyers and costs.88

85.

Robert Muir-Wood, The Macondo, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill:
Insurance Implications 4 (2010).

86.

Id.

87.

See infra Part III.C (discussing the National Flood Insurance Program).

88.

Frederic J. Frommer, Administrator Has To ‘Sell’ BP Victims on
Money, Associated Press (July 19, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://www.nbcnews
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He added that those interested in seeking a tort remedy for their
damages would be “crazy to do so.”89 In fact, BP and the GCCF have
made free legal assistance available for those filing claims with the
GCCF.90 But for those who choose not to utilize the free legal
assistance, “[d]amages for claims for . . . Damage to Real or Personal
Property . . . include the reasonable cost of estimating the damages
claimed, but not attorney’s fees or administrative costs associated
with preparation of the claim.”91 This effectively discourages private
causes of action by individuals for whom legal fees would be cost
prohibitive.
The GCCF stated in its first anniversary report that it has
consistently acted with “Efficiency and Speed”:
On this first year anniversary date, the GCCF has “processed”
virtually all of the 947,892 claims submitted by claimants; the
majority of claims remaining are those submitted during the
past two–three months and those that have not provided
sufficient documentation to resolve the claim.92

But those statistics do not paint the full picture. Immediately
after the oil spill, there was an “interim solution designed to provide

.com/id/38311190/ns/business-oil_and_energy/t/administrator-has-sell-bpvictims-money/.
89.

Id.

90.

BDO Consulting, Independent Evaluation of the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility: Report of Finding & Observations to the U.S.
Department of Justice 28 (2012) (“The GCCF informed us that, from
its inception, it attempted to arrange for a process by which claimants
would be able to receive free legal assistance. . . . [T]he GCCF entered
into an agreement with the Mississippi Center for Justice, a nonprofit,
public interest law firm, to oversee a consortium of legal services providers
in the Gulf region that provided legal assistance to all claimants who
sought it, regardless of income level. By its terms, the agreement stated
that it was not imposing ‘any limitations on the professional judgment of
legal services providers, including the ability to advise clients that they
should reject a GCCF settlement offer and instead seek compensation
from the NPFC or other oil spill fund, commence litigation, or take any
other actions.’ ”).

91.

Id. Exhibit P, at 5. One attorney reported that he “charges spill victims
a 10% fee plus 2% of his costs.” David Bario, Oil and Water: Plaintiffs’
Lawyers are Splitting Over the Performance of Kenneth Feinberg and
BP’s Fund for Oil-Spill Victims, Nat’l L.J. & Legal Times, Mar. 7,
2011, at 1.

92.

Gulf Coast Claims Facility, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility
After Its First Year of Operation 3 (2011).
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immediate relief to individuals and smaller businesses.”93 Payouts
were made in thirty-day increments and tended to be small, while the
claims process was streamlined.94 In January 2011, there were reports
that the victims, “due to their desperation . . . [were] accept[ing]
much smaller ‘quick-pay’ settlements that require[d] granting BP PLC
and other oil-spill defendants full release from future lawsuits.”95 It is
clear that although the GCCF and BP fund have been very successful
in distributing funds to victims, the system is imperfect.
By discouraging private causes of action, the GCCF lowers
transaction costs for individuals and for BP in adjudicating claims
and compensating victims. The creation of the GCCF was a boon to
Deepwater Horizon victims, since the OPA caps liability for any spill
at $75,000,000. But payouts were not uniform, the timeframe for
recovery has been unclear, and victims have been willing to take lower
payments in return for quicker settlements. The system is fraught
with issues of inequitable treatment and lacks the kind of uniformity
needed to address the needs of taxpayers with casualty losses
following major oil spills.
C.

Homeowner’s Insurance and the National Flood Insurance
Program: Inadequacy of Coverage in the Wake of Oil Spills

Insurance is an alternative avenue of recovery for oil spill victims,
albeit a limited one. First of all, private homeowner’s insurance by
and large does not cover damage from oil spills.96 But flood insurance
does. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversees
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).97 The NFIP offers
flood insurance, reduces flood damage through floodplain management
93.

Alfred R. Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow
of the Law: A Template from the Superfund § 301(e) Report, 40 Envtl.
L. Rep. News & Analysis 11121, 11122 (2010).

94.

Id.

95.

Bario, supra note 91, at 1–4.

96.

See Kenneth S. Abraham, Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of
Insurance, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1773 (2011) (“Homeowners policies
are issued to the owners of residential property to cover the risk of
direct physical loss to property. Most pollution damage affecting
homeowners, however, would not be covered by such policies. The
standard-form homeowners policy, for example, excludes coverage of loss
to covered property caused by ‘the discharge, dispersal, seepage,
migration, release or escape of pollutants’ unless the discharge, etc., is
itself the result of one of a number of named perils or causes. The only
named cause of loss that might result in pollution is ‘explosion.’ But few
spills are caused by explosions or by any of the other named ‘perils’ that
are exceptions to the exclusions in a homeowners policy, including the
pollution exclusion.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

97.

Daniel A. Farber et al., Disaster Law and Policy 311 (2010).
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regulations, and identifies and maps American floodplains, creating
“broad-based awareness of the flood hazards and provid[ing] the data
needed for floodplain management programs and to actuarially rate
new construction for flood insurance.”98 Although this federally funded
flood insurance is widely available,99 it is elective.100 Congress enacted
the NFIP to remedy deficiencies in the flood insurance market, and
property owners in communities that adopt and enforce the criteria
set forth by the NFIP may buy into the insurance program.101
Perhaps most importantly, the NFIP subsidizes the insuring owners of
“existing buildings” that were constructed prior to the enactment of
NFIP or prior to a community’s adoption of NFIP.102
A widely voiced concern in the months following the Deepwater
Horizon disaster was the possibility of oil contamination of property
due to flooding during hurricane season.103 FEMA Claims Director
James Sadler issued a memorandum on June 7, 2010, stating that as
long as there is a defined flood, “[d]amage caused by the oil in flood
waters is covered subject to the provisions of the [NFIP].”104 But the
NFIP limits the amount recoverable for damage caused by pollutants
to $10,000, and damage “to ground, soil, or land caused by flood, oil,

98.

Id. at 311–12 (quoting FEMA, National Flood
Program: Program Description 2 (Aug. 1, 2002)).

99.

Id. at 311 (“Over 19,700 communities presently participate in the NFIP.
These include nearly all communities with significant flood hazards.”
(quoting FEMA, supra note 98, at 2)).

Insurance

100. Id. at 312 (“Section 1304 of the 1968 Act authorizes the Director of
FEMA to establish and carry out ‘a national flood insurance program
which will enable interested persons to purchase insurance against loss
resulting from physical damage to or loss of real property or personal
property.’” (quoting FEMA, supra note 98, at 22)).
101. Id. (citing FEMA, supra note 98, at 22)
102. Id. (quoting FEMA, supra note 98, at 2).
103. See, e.g., Richard Rainey, Flood Insurance Will Cover Oil Damage, but
Only to Buildings, Nola.com (June 2, 2010, 8:59 PM)
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/flood_insura
nce_will_cover_oil.html (explaining how flood insurance will work in
the event that flood waters carry oil).
104. Memorandum from James A. Sadler, Claims Director, FEMA, to Write
Your Own Principal Coordinators and the National Flood Insurance
Program Servicing Agent 1 (June 7, 2010) [hereinafter Sadler
Memorandum], available at http://www.nfipiservice.com/pdf/bulletin/w
-10065a.pdf. FEMA defines “flood” as “a general and temporary
condition of partial or complete inundation of two or more acres of
normally dry land area or two or more properties . . . at least one of
which is the policyholder’s property . . . from: overflow of inland or tidal
waters[,] unusual and rapid accumulation of runoff or surface waters
from any source[, or] mudflow.” Id. at 2.
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or flood water mixed with oil is not covered.”105 Ground
contamination is likely covered through the OPA,106 but the taxpayer
would have to submit a claim to both the NFIP and to the claims
facility organized under the OPA (the GCCF, for Deepwater Horizon
victims) to be compensated. When a taxpayer accepts a payment
from the NFIP, the taxpayer subrogates his or her right to recover
payment from the party responsible for the oil spill to FEMA. And
“[i]f the policyholder makes a claim against an entity who caused a
loss and recovers any money, the policyholder must pay FEMA . . .
back before they may keep any of the money.”107
This is obviously problematic. The taxpayer pays for flood
insurance that covers only damage to his or her dwelling. The
taxpayer has to submit one claim to the NFIP for that damage and a
separate claim under the OPA to cover the costs of cleaning up the
contaminated land. When the taxpayer is compensated by the party
responsible for the oil spill, either through the OPA or a fund like the
GCCF, the taxpayer then has to determine what portion of that
compensation must be returned to FEMA under the NFIP. Two
systems designed to assist victims offer disjointed recovery and result
in added time and expense as the taxpayer determines the portion of
the recoveries to which he or she is entitled. There must be an easier
way.

IV. The Stafford Act and § 165(h)(3)(c): Applying the
Casualty Loss Provisions for Victims of Federally
Declared Disasters to Victims of Oil Spills
The Code has specific provisions108 for victims of federally
declared disasters—provisions that are triggered when the President
of the United States invokes the Stafford Act.109 Among other
105. Id.
106. A provision in the OPA makes the party responsible for the oil spill
strictly liable for removal costs and damages. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)–(b)
(2006).
107. Sadler Memorandum, supra note 104, at 2.
108. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 165(i)(1) (2006) (“[A]ny loss attributable to a disaster
occurring in an area subsequently determined by the President of the
United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government under
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
may, at the election of the taxpayer, be taken into account for the
taxable year immediately preceding the taxable year in which the
disaster occurred.”); I.R.C. § 165(k) (describing the procedure for
treatment as a disaster loss where the taxpayer is required to relocate or
demolish his or her residence because of a Stafford Act disaster
declaration).
109. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006).
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provisions, the Code allows disaster victims to elect to take their
casualty loss for either the year of the loss or the preceding year.110
Additionally, Congress has in certain instances made special tax
provisions for victims of federally declared disasters111 under the
Stafford Act. The Stafford Act “authorizes the President to issue
major disaster or emergency declarations in response to catastrophes
in the United States that overwhelm state and local governments.”112
In the wake of Deepwater Horizon, and in anticipation of future oil
spills, Congress could use the Code to bolster insufficient insurance
payouts or compensation from oil spill funds like the GCCF.113 This
could be done with or without invoking the Stafford Act; however,
Congress’s recent actions easing the Code’s casualty loss restrictions
have been done in conjunction with the Stafford Act, so it seems
likely that Congress would restrict its action to federally declared
Stafford Act disasters. The provisions already in the Code also
indicate that special tax treatment should be reserved for Stafford Act
disasters. Invoking the Stafford Act in response to the Deepwater
Horizon accident or other oil spills would be inappropriate, given the
Stafford Act’s statutory requirements, but the casualty loss
allowances in the Code and that Congress has made in the past
should be extended to oil spill victims.
Under the Stafford Act, major disasters are restricted to natural
catastrophes, including storms, earthquakes, and floods, as well as
fires, floods, and explosions, regardless of the cause.114 After a natural
catastrophe occurs, the governor of the affected state requests a major
110. I.R.C. § 165(i)(1).
111. See, e.g., Molly F. Sherlock et al., Cong. Research Serv.,
R 41323, Tax Issues and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Legal
Analysis of Payments and Tax Relief Policy Options 10 (2010),
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41323.pdf (“The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 . . . temporarily changes some of the
rules associated with claiming casualty losses for taxpayers in federally
declared disaster areas. For the 2008 and 2009 tax years, (1) all
taxpayers, including non-itemizers, could claim a disaster loss deduction;
(2) the 10% AGI limitation on disaster losses was suspended; (3) a fiveyear NOL carryback was available for disaster losses . . . ; and (4) the
amount by which individual taxpayers were required to reduce their
personal casualty losses per event was increased from $100 to $500 for
deductions claimed in 2009.” (citing Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765)).
112. Francis X. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33053, Federal
Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations,
Eligible Activities, and Funding (Summary) (2011).
113. See Sherlock et al., supra note 111, at 8 (“From an economic
perspective, tax relief may be justified as achieving distributional
objectives or addressing market failures.”).
114. McCarthy, supra note 112, at 1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5121(2) (2006)).
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disaster declaration, and the President has three options: issue a
major disaster declaration, issue an emergency declaration, or decline
the request.115 Issuing an emergency or major disaster declaration
under the Stafford Act allows for rapid and flexible FEMA
assistance116:
Emergency declarations trigger aid that protects property,
public health, and safety and lessens or averts the threat of an
incident becoming a catastrophic event. A major disaster
declaration, issued after a catastrophe occurs, constitutes
broader authority for federal agencies to provide supplemental
assistance to help state and local governments, families and
individuals, and certain nonprofit organizations recover from the
incident.117

Issuing a major catastrophe or emergency declaration in response
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster could have created redundancy
issues, since the disaster is already being addressed under the Oil
Pollution Act.118 A larger issue is the availability of tort remedies
following a Stafford Act declaration. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill
in 1989, the President turned down the governor of Alaska’s requests
for a Stafford Act declaration out of a concern that “a declaration by
the President would hinder the government’s litigation against Exxon
that promised substantial compensation for the incident.”119 An
attorney for FEMA explained,
The Department of Justice opposed a declaration of disaster by
then-President George H. W. Bush on the basis that it might
impact adversely the case of the United States against
Exxon. . . . Acting General Counsel of FEMA, George Watson,
said . . . that he had issued a legal opinion stating that no
declaration of an oil spill could be made under the Stafford
Act. . . . FEMA’s congressional liaison [issued a statement
concluding] that where a parallel statutory scheme offered both
compensation and better litigation rights to the United States
than the Stafford Act, then the president would not declare a
disaster or emergency.120
115. Id. at 10.
116. Francis X. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., R 41234, Potential
Stafford Act Declarations for the Gulf Coast Oil Spill:
Issues for Congress (2010).
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. (Summary).
119. Id. (Summary).
120. Id. at 3 (quoting William R. Cumming, Letter to the Editor, 33 Nat.
Hazards Observer, Jan. 2009, at 22, 22).
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In addition to these obstacles, the fact that BP created the fund
and established the GCCF means that there is not a pressing need for
a disaster or emergency declaration under the Stafford Act.
Additionally, one of the goals of the Stafford Act is “encouraging
individuals, States, and local governments to protect themselves by
obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace government
assistance.”121 But one of the overarching goals of the Stafford Act is
“providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private
losses sustained in disasters.”122 Congress’s legislation in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina—dropping the 10 percent AGI requirement for
casualty losses—helped achieve this goal by allowing more people to
recover their losses; provisions in the Code that are triggered by the
Stafford Act allow individuals to claim a casualty loss in the actual
year of the loss or the preceding year, creating more financial
flexibility for victims. While the OPA creates a parallel statutory
scheme and redundancy issues, and while there is always an inherent
moral hazard in the casualty loss provision of the Code, these
problems do not outweigh the broader issue that the current
framework for recovery by individual oil spill victims is not
streamlined enough to provide guaranteed, uniform recovery. The
justifications for the Stafford Act and for additional legislation passed
by Congress to bolster the tax allowances triggered by the Stafford
Act are equally applicable to the oil spill context, and can be used to
support a uniform statutory scheme to allow victims of casualty losses
to fully recover in the wake of an oil spill.

V. Reducing Transaction Costs and Streamlining the
System Through IRS Subrogation
Thus far, this Note has made several observations: Oil spills are
casualties within the meaning of Code section 165(c).123 Without a
clear framework for recovery, taxpayers contemporaneously seeking
casualty loss deductions from the IRS and recoveries from the
responsible party have the potential to suffer the adverse effects of the
Tax Benefit Rule.124 In the oil spill context, the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding that a decline in property value absent physical damage
constitutes a casualty loss needs to be adopted, over the Ninth
Circuit’s objections, either congressionally or judicially.125 The OPA,
121. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4) (2006).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(6).
123. See discussion supra Part I (discussing mechanics and application of
I.R.C. § 165(c)(3)).
124. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the Tax Benefit Rule).
125. See discussion supra Part II (discussing circuit split between the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits).
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GCCF, homeowner’s insurance, and the NFIP do not offer sufficient
protection to the victims of oil spills, and are sometimes even in
conflict.126 Oil spills are not disasters within the meaning of the
Stafford Act, but the legislative framework of the Stafford Act and
Congress’s post-Hurricane Katrina tax legislation ought to be applied
to the oil spill context.127 And the current state of affairs for oil spill
casualty losses is disjointed and inefficient. There are, no doubt,
countless ways to address the shortcomings of the current system, but
this Note proposes one solution: IRS subrogation, with an adoption of
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that property value decline constitutes
a casualty loss, a removal of the Code section 165(h) floors, and an
adoption of the Code section 165(i) election provision, allowing
recovery to all taxpayers victimized by an oil spill casualty.
Subrogation is defined as “[t]he substitution of one party for
another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to
rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the
debtor.”128 A party is subrogated to the rights of another “when the
first party steps into the second party’s shoes . . . and assumes the
second party’s rights against a third party.”129 There are three types
of subrogation: equitable, contractual, and statutory. Equitable, or
legal, subrogation “arises by operation of law,”130 and “is a creature of
equity; is enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of
substantial justice; and is independent of any contractual relations
between parties.”131 Courts have laid out different standards to invoke
the doctrine of equitable subrogation. A typical formulation of the
elements of equitable subrogation is
(1) the party claiming subrogation has paid the debt; (2) the
party was not a volunteer, but had a direct interest in the
discharge of the debt or lien; (3) the party was secondarily
126. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the OPA, GCCF, and
insurance).
127. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing the Stafford Act).
128. Black’s Law Dictionary 1563–64 (9th ed. 2009).
129. Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation 274 (5th
ed. 2010) (“For example, suppose that the insured’s home is destroyed
by a fire negligently set by her neighbor, and the . . . insurer pays the
insured the amount of the loss. The insurer is then entitled to recover
this amount from the neighbor, either directly in a suit against the
neighbor (in what would be called ‘active’ subrogation), or as the real
party in interest in a suit brought by the insured, through a right to be
reimbursed out of the proceeds of such a suit (in what might be called
‘passive’ subrogation.)”).
130. Id.
131. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136 n.12 (1962) (quoting
Memphis & L.R.R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301–02 (1887)).
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liable for the debt or for the discharge of the lien; and (4) no
injustice will be done to the other party by the allowance of the
equity.132

Contractual, or conventional, subrogation “results from an agreement
of the parties,”133 and usually takes the form of a subrogation clause
in a contract. Statutory subrogation is codified in a state’s insurance
legislation.134
The federal government, too, has statutory subrogation rights.135
For example, the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act136 gives the
United States government the “right to reimbursement as [a] subrogee
to third-party tort claims of certain individuals, such as military
personnel and their dependents, who receive free medical or dental
care.”137 Likewise, there is a Medicare provision under which the
“United States is subrogated to any right of an individual or entity to
payment with respect to [an] item or service when Medicare is [the]
primary plan.”138 The NFIP gives FEMA subrogation rights for oil
spill damage when an insured receives a financial recovery from a
responsible party.139 President Obama submitted a legislative package
to Congress outlining a similar approach for unemployment funds,
requiring that BP “reimburse the government for unemployment
wages paid to the individual while the individual’s claim is being
processed.”140 Supplemental nutrition assistance and commodity
distributions to victims likewise would have been charged to BP

132. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 745,
749 n.3 (D.S.C. 2009) (quoting Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assoc., 538 S.E.2d
15, 30 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000)).
133. Abraham, supra note 129, at 274.
134. See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry II & Douglas R. Richmond,
Understanding Insurance Law 680 (4th ed. 2007) (“[I]t is common
for statutes to create, limit, or prohibit subrogation with respect to
uninsured, underinsured, first-party medical, and no-fault coverages.”).
135. See id. at 681 n.117 (using the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act as
an example of a federal statute giving subrogation rights to the federal
government).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006).
137. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 134, at 681 n.117.
138. Id.
139. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing NFIP subrogation); note 112
and accompanying text (noting that the damage caused by oil in flood
waters is covered by NFIP).
140. Press Release, White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill Legislative Package (May 12, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-deepwaterhorizon-oil-spill-legislative-package.
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under the proposed legislative package.141 Statutory subrogation is
nothing new for the United States government, and in the context of
casualty losses from the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it could provide
a workable solution to lower transaction costs and ensure that victims
are adequately compensated for their losses.
The OPA includes a section on subrogation of claims,142 providing
that “[a]ny person . . . who pays compensation pursuant to this Act
to any claimant for removal costs or damages shall be subrogated to
all rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant has under
any other law.”143 This subrogation clause is expansive enough that it
could include the IRS.
By implementing subrogation, the IRS “could aim to recover the
amount of tax revenue lost directly because of the deduction taken by
the tort victim.”144 In an article proposing subrogation of section 165
casualty loss deductions, Andrew Blair-Stanek proposes three methods
by which the IRS could implement subrogation. In the absence of
statutory authority, he suggests first that the IRS could “issue
regulations giving itself the power to pursue subrogation rights and
hope that courts find these regulations worthy of the relevant level of
deference.”145 Second, the IRS could, as an alternative, “simply claim
equitable subrogation rights.”146 He notes that courts would likely be
unsympathetic to these two approaches,147 and he is probably correct.
It is difficult to say how an individual court would reasonably
interpret the Internal Revenue Code. Equitable subrogation is “an
equitable right whereby a nonvolunteer who is secondarily liable for
and pays a third party’s debt succeeds to the creditor’s rights against
that third party.”148 The IRS would be a volunteer in this situation
and would not be secondarily liable.
His third suggestion is statutory subrogation: “[S]ubrogation
would probably require congressional authorization, which could also
address procedural details such as venue, notice, available defenses,
the effect of contractual waivers, and the deductibility of a
tortfeasor’s payments to a prevailing IRS.”149 This is the most realistic
141. Id.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 2715 (2006).
143. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a).
144. Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 342.
145. Id. at 343.
146. Id.
147. See id. (“[C]ourts would likely hesitate to find a subrogation right in a
reasonable interpretation of the statute.”).
148. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 134, at 680.
149. Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 343–44.
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of his three proposals. For one thing, congressional action permitted
the elimination of section 165(h) floors following Hurricane Katrina.
This precedent for alleviating strains on taxpayers following major
crises indicates that Congress might be willing to make similar
adjustments based on public policy considerations in the oil spill
context.
There would likely be three main arguments against implementing
IRS subrogation in this context. First, the administrative costs to the
IRS would be high. The IRS would have to set up a system to
monitor and evaluate claims, and maybe even set up an auditing
system. The current system could, however, be tweaked to allow for
this new framework:
When taking § 165 deductions, taxpayers currently must fill out
a form listing each property damaged, along with insurance
information, date acquired, and fair market values. It would not
be difficult to require brief information about the cause of the
loss. This information would allow the IRS to perform a quick
cost-benefit analysis and decide whether to pursue its
subrogation rights.150

After allowing the casualty loss deduction, the IRS would then sue
the tortfeasor to recover the lost revenue.151 If successful, the taxpayer
has received the deduction, and the IRS has recovered lost revenue
from allowing the deduction. Granted, there would be a transaction
cost to the IRS in enforcing its subrogation rights that would not be
covered by a favorable outcome to such a lawsuit. The OPA offers a
solution to this problem:
The Fund shall be available to the President for . . . the
payment of Federal administrative, operational, and personnel
costs and expenses reasonably necessary for and incidental to
the implementation, administration, and enforcement of this
Act . . . with respect to prevention, removal, and enforcement
related to oil discharges . . . .152

150. Id. at 343.
151. Blair-Stanek proposes that, at this point, “the victim will probably often
join the lawsuit to vindicate her full rights . . . [and] the IRS could
simply leave the suit. Should the victim recover, the taxpayer would lose
the deduction, thereby restoring the Treasury to the same position as if
it had won on its own.” Id. at 344. While this point is well taken, it
arguably defeats the purpose of lowering transaction costs to individual
taxpayers. A more efficient approach may be to have the casualty loss
deduction be the final mode of recovery for a taxpayer in this situation.
152. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)–(a)(5) (2006).
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It remains to be seen whether the President could or would utilize
funds under the OPA to compensate the IRS for a subrogation
program for casualty losses to individuals, but there is statutory
framework in place to support such a decision.
The second criticism to this approach is that low-income
taxpayers do not benefit as much from an income tax deduction as
high-income taxpayers. A solution to this problem could be to provide
a casualty loss credit instead of a casualty loss deduction. The
feasibility of this option is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is
certainly an option worth considering, because a “refundable tax
credit would provide a more equitable benefit across income levels.”153
A suggestion for limiting this kind of taxpayer recovery is to limit the
credit to “a fixed amount, which would limit compensation for
taxpayers with higher uninsured losses.”154 But this kind of limitation
could cause run-ins with the insurance issues discussed in Part III.C.
The framework and feasibility of such a program would need to be
explored further, prior to implementation.
The third criticism questions why the section 165(i) Stafford Act
election provision should apply, and why the 165(h) floors should be
removed in this context at all. But “tax relief may be justified as
achieving distributional objectives or addressing market failures.
Market failures occur when resources are not efficiently allocated due
to unpriced costs or benefits.”155 Market failures following an oil spill
like Deepwater Horizon include imperfections in the statutory
framework of the OPA, imperfections in the existing insurance
options, and the unchartered territory of the GCCF. “From this
perspective, the nation broadly shares the risk of large-scale disasters
by providing federal relief where insurance markets are incomplete.”156
While BP is expected to compensate individuals for losses, thus
weighing against an argument for reduced tax liability to Deepwater
Horizon victims, the systemic flaws of the GCCF, OPA, and
insurance discussed in Part III indicate that a different framework is
necessary to uniformly compensate taxpayers who are in need.
Streamlining the recovery process by dropping the floors to allow
more widespread recovery, and allowing the taxpayer to choose the
year in which to claim the casualty loss deduction to “accelerate the
benefit associated with the loss deduction during a time of need,”157
reduces a taxpayer’s recovery process to making one claim, on his or

153. Sherlock et al., supra note 111, at 10.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 8.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 10.
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her tax return, instead of jumping through the hoops of the private
insurance, the NFIP, the OPA, and the GCCF.

Conclusion
The current system of casualty loss compensation for taxpayers
victimized by oil spills like the Deepwater Horizon disaster is flawed.
This Note’s proposal—IRS subrogation of casualty loss claims coupled
with the adoption of Code section 165(i) Stafford Act election and an
elimination of the Code section 165(h) floors—is by no means perfect
either. But ideas like this are a step in the right direction toward
providing a streamlined, equitable system of taxpayer recovery for
casualty losses in the wake of future oil spills.
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